Ballot 186 – Limiting the Reuse of Validation Information

Ballot overview

• Ballot 186, Limiting the Reuse of Validation Information, is shown on the CA/Browser Forum ballot page.
• The page states that this ballot lacked endorsers.
• The supplied evidence does not include voting dates, discussion dates, IPR end, or any adopted normative text for this ballot.

Result

• The ballot did not become normative based on the supplied evidence because it lacked endorsers.
• No compliance date is established in the evidence.

Scope described on the page

• The page text describes a ballot that would have maintained consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097.
• The described changes include:
  • A carve-out of logging requirements for DNSSEC, stating those are not in scope.
  • A note that change management logging can confirm whether the appropriate controls are in effect for audit purposes.
  • Sunsetting remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs.
  • Requiring revocation of all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm.
  • Clarifying that SHA-1 may still be used to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as required by RFC 5019.
  • Minor formatting corrections.