Re: MRSP Intermediate Violations (5.3), Mass Report of 26 Subordinate CAs
2026/07/20 -- Wayne
PKI News
Re: MRSP Intermediate Violations (5.3), Mass Report of 26 Subordinate CAs
2026/07/20 -- Michael Stone
Re: MRSP Intermediate Violations (5.3), Mass Report of 26 Subordinate CAs
2026/07/20 -- 'Matthew McPherrin' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
MRSP Intermediate Violations (5.3), Mass Report of 26 Subordinate CAs
2026/07/20 -- Wayne
Let's Encrypt: CRLs Temporarily Missing Revoked Serials
This case is a self-reported incident by Let’s Encrypt about CRL publication. Let’s Encrypt monitoring (crl-monitor) detected that a database replication/network instability caused recently added revocation entries to be…
HARICA: Issuance of Server TLS Certificates with id-kp-clientAuth KeyPurposeID after CP/CPS cutoff
HARICA reported a preliminary incident in which it continued to issue server TLS certificates containing the `id-kp-clientAuth` KeyPurposeID in the `extKeyUsage` extension after HARICA’s internal CP/CPS cutoff of 2026-06…
D-Trust incident report on CRL URL disclosure mismatches in CCADB
This case concerns D-Trust’s incident report about four CCADB Intermediate CA certificate records whose disclosed CRL URLs did not exactly match the CRL URLs encoded in the corresponding certificates, contrary to CCADB P…
Certainly LLC: Expired certificates served on BR §2.2 test websites (valid/revoked)
Certainly LLC self-reported that its BR §2.2 TLS test websites served expired TLS certificates. The incident began on 2026-06-08 when the certificates on the “valid” and “revoked” test sites expired and were not renewed,…
Certainly: Missing audit log entries for certificates issued during capacity testing
Certainly reported a compliance incident it discovered during its annual WebTrust audit. It stated that 5,868 certificates issued during planned capacity characterization testing on 2026-04-01 and 2026-04-02 are missing …
HARICA: external report alleging continued issuance and refusal to revoke DV TLS certificates for domains associated with EU-sanctioned entities
This case was opened by an external reporter who alleged that HARICA issued and continued to maintain DV TLS certificates for domains that the reporter and other commenters associated with EU-sanctioned entities, and tha…
IdenTrust: End-entity TLS certificate mis-issuance against CP/CPS (extra IdenTrust certificate policy OIDs)
IdenTrust Services, LLC self-reported a compliance issue discovered in an internal review of its TrustID TLS CP/CPS v5.0.3. On 2026-06-16, it found that 42,858 TLS end-entity certificates were issued with the certificate…
Netlock incident: AIA CA Issuers endpoints served PEM-encoded CA certificates instead of DER
This case concerns Netlock’s incident report about Authority Information Access (AIA) CA Issuers HTTP endpoints that returned issuer certificates in PEM format instead of the DER encoding required by RFC 5280 section 4.2…
Actalis: Undisclosed Subordinate CA Certificate
Actalis reported an incident in which it was notified by a Root Program representative that the subordinate CA certificate Actalis Code Signing CA G2 (SHA-256: 8CC827CEA1CD8DB79AEB7CD4BEEAE36658AF7B4C0606C257B7538AB1E710…
Firmaprofesional: 2026 audit-delay explanatory letter
This bug is for Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional to provide a signed explanatory letter from its Qualified Auditor regarding delayed 2026 Audit Attestation Letters (AALs). The attachment is described as coveri…
Apple: Audit Documents missing 2 Sub-CAs
Apple reported that its 2026 WebTrust audit reports did not include two Subordinate CA Certificates created on 2026-02-04. Apple states the two impacted Subordinate CAs should have been included in the WTCA, WTBR, and WT…
Add SECOM TLS RSA Root CA 2024 and SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024
SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. requested Mozilla root program inclusion for two trust anchors: SECOM TLS RSA Root CA 2024 and SECOM TLS ECC Root CA 2024, providing certificate subject/validity details and repository and c…
Add Telia Company's S/MIME & TLS Roots
Telia Company requested inclusion of its v3 generation dedicated TLS and S/MIME Root CAs in multiple root stores. The request identified four roots: Telia EC TLS Root CA v3, Telia RSA TLS Root CA v3, Telia EC Email Root …
Add SECOM SMIME RSA Root CA 2024
SECOM Trust Systems CO., LTD. requested inclusion of the “SECOM SMIME RSA Root CA 2024” root certificate in Mozilla’s root store. The thread includes the certificate subject details and links to the certificate file and …
NETLOCK OCSP responder incident; CPR response-time failure tracked separately in Bug 2052541
This bug now tracks NETLOCK’s OCSP responder incident only. NETLOCK reported that a publicly trusted TLS certificate it issued for nsi.netlock.hu was not propagated to its OCSP infrastructure, causing the responder to re…
eMudhra emSign PKI Services: ACME workflow added unrequested “www” SAN without subscriber authorization
This case reports that eMudhra’s ACME issuance workflow automatically added the corresponding “www” subdomain to the certificate SAN when the subscriber requested only the base domain. eMudhra stated this “www” SAN inclu…
CCA India: Misissuance detected by PKIMetal (Certificate Policies explicitText encoding)
This case concerns CCA India’s issuance of TLS certificates under the publicly trusted hierarchy "IDRBT CA SPL 2022-1" where the Certificate Policies extension explicitText was reported as encoded using VisibleString or …
Kamu SM: Incorrect CRL served at SSL CRL distribution point (issuer DN mismatch)
Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi (Kamu SM) reported that, during a key rollover for its Mobile Qualified Electronic Certificate subordinate CA, a configuration error in its CRL publication process caused an unintended CRL to b…
DigiCert WebTrust audits and related CA documents
This case was opened by DigiCert to upload WebTrust audit packages and has continued to be used as a repository for audit-related CA documents. In 2019, Mozilla and community participants questioned how DigiCert and its …
Re: CCADB Update - CCADB ID replacement and new AllCertificateRecords REST API
2026/07/13 -- Corey Bonnell
Firmaprofesional: Chrome Root Program Policy non-compliance for dedicated TLS hierarchy / EKU requirements (preliminary incident report)
Firmaprofesional reported a Chrome Root Program incident regarding its Chrome-included root, `Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068`. Chrome notified Firmaprofesional that unexpired and unrevoked subo…
CCADB Update - CCADB ID replacement and new AllCertificateRecords REST API
2026/07/09 -- CCADB Support
SC087 - Registration Number Improvement for EV Certificates
SC087 - Registration Number Improvement for EV Certificates Copy file from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cabforum/servercert/eb3b17de700b7aae63299e576adb8f00f6a5e41a/docs/EVG.md to new branch Voted on 2026-06-03 Fini…
Re: Clarification on CCADB Section 5.2: Incident Disclosure Across Mixed Subordinate CA Audit Scopes
2026/07/01 -- 大野文彰（ONO Fumiaki）
Re: Clarification on CCADB Section 5.2: Incident Disclosure Across Mixed Subordinate CA Audit Scopes
2026/07/01 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
Clarification on CCADB Section 5.2: Incident Disclosure Across Mixed Subordinate CA Audit Scopes
2026/06/30 -- 大野文彰（ONO Fumiaki）
NSS trust-store modification by official FINA Linux certificate client package
2026/06/29 -- 'certifikati' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
MRSP 3.1: MRSP Publication and Guidance
2026/06/29 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Improving Transparency and Assurance in the Web PKI: Mozilla Root Store Policy v3.1
Mozilla remains committed to maintaining a secure, trustworthy, and transparent Web PKI. Today we are announcing the publication of Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) version 3.1, effective July 1, 2026. … Read more …
CCADB Update: New Example Certificates feature on Add/Update Root Request cases
2026/06/24 -- 'Dustin Hollenback' via CCADB Public
CCADB Update: New Example Certificates feature on Add/Update Root Request cases
2026/06/18 -- 'Dustin Hollenback' via CCADB Public
Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory in the Certificat…
Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory in the CertificatePolicies extension for Subscriber certificates (#57) * Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory in the CertificatePolicies extension for Su…
SC-098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters (#567)
SC-098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters (#567) Update 3.2.2.8 to require that CAs process CAA accounturi and validationmethod parameters defined in RFC 8657 Fixes https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/issues/353 -------…
MRSP 3.1: Planned Effective Date of 7/1/2026
2026/06/15 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
[INFORMATIONAL] Chrome Root Store Inclusion Application Decision - OISTE
2026/06/11 -- 'Chrome Root Program' via CCADB Public
Notice of Intent to Approve SECOM Trust Systems Co., Ltd. Root Inclusion Requests
2026/06/05 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Notice of Intent to Approve Telia's Root Inclusion Requests
2026/06/05 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Conclusion of Public Discussion – SECOM Root Inclusion Requests
2026/06/05 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
Conclusion of Public Discussion – Telia Company Root Inclusion Requests
2026/06/05 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
A Post-Quantum Future for Let's Encrypt
Let’s Encrypt is committed to a post-quantum-safe Web PKI. The path we’re planning to take is Merkle Tree Certificates (“MTCs”), a new approach that adds post-quantum authentication to the web wit…
Re: MRSP 3.1: Results of CA Communication and Survey
2026/06/01 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
MRSP 3.1: Results of CA Communication and Survey
2026/05/29 -- 'Ben Wilson' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Re: Microsoft MX servers use certificate chaining to obsolete DigiCert Global Root CA
2026/05/21 -- 'Q Misell' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Re: Microsoft MX servers use certificate chaining to obsolete DigiCert Global Root CA
2026/05/21 -- 'Martijn Katerbarg' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Re: Microsoft MX servers use certificate chaining to obsolete DigiCert Global Root CA
2026/05/21 -- 'Q Misell' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Microsoft MX servers use certificate chaining to obsolete DigiCert Global Root CA
2026/05/21 -- Hanno Böck
Ballot SC-099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods (#656)
Ballot SC-099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods (#656) The current BRs contain the following text in Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5: > CAs SHALL maintain a record of which [domain/IP] validation method, including…
RE: MRSP 3.1: Issue #s 282 and 295: CP/CPS Documentation
2026/05/15 -- 'Roman Fischer' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Re: MozillaIntermediateCertsCSVReport — blank line after -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- in 18 Amazon S-series rows
2026/05/14 -- Anupama M
Re: MRSP 3.1: Issue #s 294, 296, 297, and 298: Audit-related Improvements
2026/05/14 -- 大野文彰（ONO Fumiaki）
Re: MozillaIntermediateCertsCSVReport — blank line after -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- in 18 Amazon S-series rows
2026/05/13 -- 'Trevoli Ponds-White' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Re: MRSP 3.1: Issue #s 282 and 295: CP/CPS Documentation
2026/05/13 -- 'Trevoli Ponds-White' via dev-security-policy@mozilla.org
Ballot SMC016: Equivalence with Ballots SC096 and SC097 (#300)
Ballot SMC016: Equivalence with Ballots SC096 and SC097 (#300)
Update effective date based on IPR Review closure (#664)
Update effective date based on IPR Review closure (#664)
CCADB Update: Clearer task lists, less clutter, and better ICA document tracking
2026/04/30 -- CCADB Support
Re: 401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/15 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
Re: 401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/14 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
Re: 401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/13 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
Re: 401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/13 -- Wayne
Re: 401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/13 -- Wayne
401 Unauthorized for all requests for AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormatv4
2026/04/13 -- 'Rob Stradling' via CCADB Public
Re: Public Discussion of Cybertrust Japan's SecureSign Root CA16
2026/04/13 -- 'Ben Wilson' via CCADB Public
The difficulty of making sure your website is broken
Have you ever needed to make sure your website has a broken certificate? While many tools exist to help run an HTTPS server with valid certificates, there aren’t tools to make sure your certificate is revoked or ex…
CCADB Update: Government of Saudi Arabia, NIC root CA certificate record transition to Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA)'s CCADB account
2026/04/08 -- CCADB Support
Proposed update to the AllCertificateRecordsCSVFormat report
2026/04/03 -- CCADB Support
Cleanup 2025 (#628)
Cleanup 2025 (#628) BR 2.2.6, approved by ballot SC095v3
SMC015v2 - mDL Authentication of Individual Identity (#290)
SMC015v2 - mDL Authentication of Individual Identity (#290) * Version * Revision table * References * Attribute collection * Validation of mDL * Numbering fix * Reference update * eIDAS reference * Update eIDAS link * Up…
Simplifying Certificate Renewals for Millions of Domains with ACME Renewal Information (ARI)
Nick Silverman is a Senior Infrastructure Engineer on the Edge Infrastructure team at Shopify, where he maintains the systems that provision, renew, and publish SSL certificates for millions of merchants’ custom do…
Six-Day and IP Address Certificates Available in Certbot
This was also posted on EFF’s blog. As we announced earlier this year, Let’s Encrypt now issues IP address and six-day certificates to the general public. The Certbot team at the Electronic Frontier Foundatio…
Ballot SC-097 (V1): "Sunset all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in …
Ballot SC-097 (V1): "Sunset all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs" (#645) **Purpose of Ballot SC-097:** This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Ma…
Shorter Certificate Lifetimes and Rate Limits
As previously announced, over the next two years we will be switching the default certificate lifetime from 90 days to 64 days, and then 45 days. This will ultimately double the number of certificate renewal requests eac…
DNS-PERSIST-01: A New Model for DNS-based Challenge Validation
When you request a certificate from Let’s Encrypt, our servers validate that you control the hostnames in that certificate using ACME challenges. For subscribers who need wildcard certificates or who prefer not to …
Ballot SC-96: Carve-out for DNSSEC verification logging requirements …
Ballot SC-96: Carve-out for DNSSEC verification logging requirements (#641) BRs 2.2.4
SC94: Add partial exception for DNSSEC checks for email DCV methods (…
SC94: Add partial exception for DNSSEC checks for email DCV methods (#637) BRs version 2.2.3
Update build-guidelines-action to version 2.2.1 (#299)
Update build-guidelines-action to version 2.2.1 (#299) * Update build-guidelines-action to version 2.2.1 * Update action to use Docker image for build guidelines
On the Importance of "Hello" and "Thanks"
In a recent conversation with a Let’s Encrypt subscriber, we asked them to guess how many people work at ISRG, the nonprofit behind Let’s Encrypt (and Prossimo and Divvi Up). Their guess was about 100; they&r…
6-day and IP Address Certificates are Generally Available
Update: March 11, 2026 If you use Certbot, see Six-Day and IP Address Certificates Available in Certbot for details on requesting these certificates. Short-lived and IP address certificates are now generally available fr…
SC-090: "Gradually sunset all remaining email-based, phone-based, and…
SC-090: "Gradually sunset all remaining email-based, phone-based, and ‘crossover’ validation methods from Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5" (#616) BRs v2.2.2 **Notes:** - As of 09 September 2025, this proposal is *…
A Note from our Executive Director
This letter was originally published in our 2025 Annual Report. This year was the 10th anniversary of Let’s Encrypt. We’ve come a long way! Today we’re serving more than 700 million websites, issuing te…
Ballot SC-91: Sunset 3.2.2.5.3 Reverse Address Lookup Validation, pro…
Ballot SC-91: Sunset 3.2.2.5.3 Reverse Address Lookup Validation, proposal of new DNS-based validation using Persistent DCV TXT Record for IP addresses (#626) BRs v 2.2.1 ## Ballot SC-91: “Sunset 3.2.2.5.3 Reverse Addres…
SC-86: Sunset the Inclusion of Domain Names with an IP Reverse Zone S…
SC-86: Sunset the Inclusion of Domain Names with an IP Reverse Zone Suffix (#573) BRs 2.2.0
10 Years of Let's Encrypt Certificates
On September 14, 2015, our first publicly-trusted certificate went live. We were proud that we had issued a certificate that a significant majority of clients could accept, and had done it using automated software. Of co…
Decreasing Certificate Lifetimes to 45 Days
Let’s Encrypt will be reducing the validity period of the certificates we issue. We currently issue certificates valid for 90 days, which will be cut in half to 45 days by 2028. This change is being made along with the r…
New "Generation Y" Hierarchy of Root and Intermediate Certificates
In a ceremony held in September, Let’s Encrypt generated two new Root Certification Authorities (CAs) and six new Intermediate CAs, which we’re collectively calling the “Generation Y” hierarchy. Now we’re moving to begin…
CSC-31: Maximum Validity Reduction (#48) (#51)
CSC-31: Maximum Validity Reduction (#48) (#51) * CSC-31: Maximum Validity Reduction (#48) * Update CSBR.md for proposed validity period change Updating to mostly match ian's original verbiage. However, given that we …
SC088v3: DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value DCV Method
SC088v3: DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value DCV Method
SC092: Sunset use of Precertificate Signing CAs (#630)
SC092: Sunset use of Precertificate Signing CAs (#630) * Sunset precert signing cas (#629) * Update version and revision table * Fix formatting * fix formatting * Change order of effective dates in table 1.2.2. * One mor…
v1.0.12 - Ballot SMC014 (#285)
v1.0.12 - Ballot SMC014 (#285) The Intellectual Property Review (IPR) period for Ballot SMC014 (DNSSEC for CAA) has completed. No IPR Exclusion Notices were filed, and the ballot is adopted as of October 13, 2025.
Ten Years of Community Support
Seth Schoen was an early contributor to Let's Encrypt through his work at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. He's also one of the longest standing participants in the Let's Encrypt community support forum, so we asked h…
ACME Renewal Information (ARI) Published as RFC 9773
Let’s Encrypt has been proud to work with the IETF to maintain ACME as an open standard since we first developed the technology a decade ago. We’re happy to announce that IETF has published our latest additio…
Native ACME Support Comes to NGINX
NGINX and Let's Encrypt share a common vision of an open and secure web. Now, with built-in support for ACME, the world's most popular web server, reverse proxy and ingress controller for Kubernetes can simplify certific…
Fix formatting in table 1.2.1 (#613)
Fix formatting in table 1.2.1 (#613)
SC-089: Mass Revocation Planning (#611)
SC-089: Mass Revocation Planning (#611) * SC-089: Mass Revocation Planning (#610) * Initial draft of 5.7.1.2 Here is an initial draft of a proposal to add section 5.7.1.2 to the TLS Baseline Requirements. See Issue #602 …
v1.0.11 - Ballot SMC013 (#284)
v1.0.11 - Ballot SMC013 (#284) This text introduces specifications for the use of two post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, as standardized by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in the …
v1.0.10 - Ballot SMC012 (#282)
v1.0.10 - Ballot SMC012 (#282) This text introduces a new method for validation of mailbox control, using ACME for S/MIME as defined in RFC 8823: Extensions to Automatic Certificate Management Environment for End-User S/…
Firefox Security Response to pwn2own 2025
At Mozilla, we consider security to be a paramount aspect of the web. This is why not only does Firefox have a long running bug bounty program but also mature … Read more The post Firefox Security Response to pwn2o…
v1.0.9 - Ballot SMC011 (#272)
v1.0.9 - Ballot SMC011 (#272) * Date * Add EUID Definition * 7.1.4.2.2 (d) add note 4 * Appendix A.1 update * Minor * Revision table * Minor update to Definition * Reconfigure Note 4 * Minor format Note 4 * Minor format …
Bump Ubuntu runner to latest (#279)
Bump Ubuntu runner to latest (#279)
Updated GPG key for signing Firefox Releases
The GPG key used to sign the Firefox release manifests is expiring soon, and so we’re going to be switching over to a new signing subkey shortly. The GPG fingerprint … Read more The post Updated GPG key for signing…
Enhancing CA Practices: Key Updates in Mozilla Root Store Policy, v3.0
Mozilla remains committed to fostering a secure, agile, and transparent Web PKI ecosystem. The new Mozilla Root Store Policy (MRSP) v3.0, effective March 15, 2025, introduces critical updates to strengthen … Read m…
Ballot SMC010 - Introduction of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroborat…
Ballot SMC010 - Introduction of Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (#260) This ballot includes updates for the following: • Require pre-linting of leaf end entity Certificates starting September 15, 2025 • Require …
Ballot SMC09 - Pre-Linting, WebTrust for NetSec, and Minor Updates (…
Ballot SMC09 - Pre-Linting, WebTrust for NetSec, and Minor Updates (#257)
Update upload-artifact to v4 due to github deprecation (#262)
Update upload-artifact to v4 due to github deprecation (#262)
Behind the Scenes: Fixing an In-the-Wild Firefox Exploit
At Mozilla, browser security is a critical mission, and part of that mission involves responding swiftly to new threats. Tuesday, around 8 AM Eastern time, we received a heads-up from … Read more The post Behind th…
Revert to commit 3a88910dd9ac43e3278514e8359778bfec4ad723 (#256)
Revert to commit 3a88910dd9ac43e3278514e8359778bfec4ad723 (#256)
Merge branch 'MPIC_discussion' into main
Merge branch 'MPIC_discussion' into main
Update to 4.2.2.2 for effective dates
Update to 4.2.2.2 for effective dates
Ballot SMC08 - Deprecate Legacy Generation Profiles and Minor Updates…
Ballot SMC08 - Deprecate Legacy Generation Profiles and Minor Updates (#253) The S/MIME Baseline Requirements include a set of Legacy profiles designed to ease the transition into an audited framework, with the expectati…
CSC-26 final adjustments (#40)
CSC-26 final adjustments (#40) * CSC-26 final adjustments * Fix links
CSC-26: Timestamping Private Key Protection (#34)
CSC-26: Timestamping Private Key Protection (#34) * Timestamp Certificate, SubCA and Key restrictions * Add log and witness requirements for key destruction * Add effective dates * Typo correction * Align date format * U…
CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements (#38)
CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements (#38) * First import of EV Guidelines version 1.8.0 * Added organizationIdentifier and extension. Added EVG definitions all the way up to the term "Registered…
Firefox will upgrade more Mixed Content in Version 127
Most of the web already supports HTTPS: In fact, 93% of requests made by Firefox are already HTTPS. As a reminder, HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) fixes the security shortcoming of HTTP … Read more The post Firefox will upgr…
Rapidly Leveling up Firefox Security
At Mozilla, we believe in an open web that is safe to use. To that end, we improve and maintain the security of people using Firefox around the world. This … Read more The post Rapidly Leveling up Firefox Security …
CSC-22: High risk changes (#31)
CSC-22: High risk changes (#31) * Restore EV guidelines version reference * Capitalize "MUST NOT" (#19) * Assign ballot number, fix ballot name * High risk ballot draft language * Restore and tweak reference to…
CSC-21: Improved signing services requirements (#12)
CSC-21: Improved signing services requirements (#12) * Fix typos * Prepare final copy assuming IPR review is clean * Import of Word doc changes to Git * Clarify that SSs are not DTPs in 8.1 * Update may to MAY * Integrat…
Bump actions/upload-artifact from 3 to 4 (#32)
Bump actions/upload-artifact from 3 to 4 (#32) Bumps [actions/upload-artifact](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact) from 3 to 4. - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/upload-artifact/releases) - [Commits](h…
CSC-20 (#30)
CSC-20 (#30) * Restore EV guidelines version reference * Capitalize "MUST NOT" (#19) * Assign ballot number, fix ballot name * Add effective date
Mozilla VPN Security Audit 2023
To provide transparency into our ongoing efforts to protect your privacy and security on the Internet, we are releasing a security audit of Mozilla VPN that Cure53 conducted earlier this … Read more The post Mozill…
Version 2.9 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy
Online security is constantly evolving, and thus we are excited to announce the publication of MRSP version 2.9, demonstrating that we are committed to keep up with the advancement of … Read more The post Version 2…
Bump tooling version, fix version table formatting (#28)
Bump tooling version, fix version table formatting (#28) * Bump tooling version * Fix table
Updated GPG key for signing Firefox Releases
The GPG key used to sign the Firefox release manifests is expiring soon, and so we’re going to be switching over to new key shortly. The new GPG fingerprint is … Read more The post Updated GPG key for signing Firef…
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