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Bugzilla #2043837 Ca Certificate Compliance Certificate Misissuance Validation Issue Problem Reporting Failure Remediation Tracking

eMudhra ACME workflow added unrequested “www” SAN entries; incident report completed and pending closure

RESOLVED FIXED eMudhra Technologies Limited
This summary was auto-generated by AI and revised by me when needed — accuracy improves with each update. Always refer to the official Bugzilla thread as the authoritative source. If you spot an inaccuracy, let me know via the contact form.
AI Summary

This case concerns eMudhra’s ACME issuance workflow automatically appending the corresponding “www” label to certificates requested for a base domain only. The issue was triggered by a customer complaint and eMudhra said the added name was not explicitly requested or authorized by the subscriber. eMudhra clarified that domain control validation was performed using DNS TXT record-based validation and that the problem was limited to subscriber authorization, not domain validation. The company reported that 239 TLS/SSL DV and OV end-entity certificates were affected, disabled the ACME auto-addition logic on 2026-05-30, and revoked all 239 valid affected certificates by 2026-06-02 19:15 UTC. eMudhra then completed all listed remediation items, including the pre-issuance SAN-vs-CSR gate, the non-ACME channel audit, and post-issuance monitoring. On 2026-09-07 eMudhra posted a closure summary requesting closure, and on 2026-09-08 CCADB issued a final call for comments with closure expected around 2026-09-14.

Model: gpt-5.4-mini Generated: 2026-06-13 21:33 UTC Revised: 2026-09-20 06:00 UTC Confidence: 0.98 14 comments
Chronology
  1. Earliest affected subscriber certificate was issued via ACME with an unrequested “www” SAN added to a base-domain request.
  2. eMudhra disabled the ACME www auto-addition logic.
  3. All 239 valid affected certificates were revoked.
  4. eMudhra completed the pre-issuance SAN-vs-CSR validation gate.
  5. eMudhra completed the audit of non-ACME issuance channels.
  6. eMudhra completed automated post-issuance monitoring for SAN entries outside CSR scope.
  7. eMudhra posted a closure summary and requested closure of the incident report.
Thread Activity
  1. Emudhra representative — Filed a preliminary incident report describing the ACME workflow’s automatic inclusion of “www” in the SAN for base-domain requests.
  2. Emudhra representative — Submitted the full incident report stating that 239 certificates were affected and all valid affected certificates were revoked by 2026-06-02 19:15 UTC.
  3. Mozilla representative — Asked eMudhra to clarify which ACME validation method was used and whether the automatically added “www” identifier was separately validated before issuance.
  4. Emudhra representative — Confirmed DNS TXT record-based validation was used and said the incident was limited to subscriber authorization, not domain validation.
  5. Emudhra representative — Reported that the pre-issuance SAN-vs-CSR validation gate was complete, while non-ACME channel audit and post-issuance monitoring were still in progress.
  6. Emudhra representative — Posted a status update marking the non-ACME channel audit complete and leaving automated post-issuance monitoring ongoing.
  7. Emudhra representative — Requested that the Next Update field be set to 2026-08-31.
  8. Emudhra representative — Posted a status update marking the post-issuance monitoring action item complete.
  9. Emudhra representative — Posted a report closure summary stating that all action items were complete and requesting closure.
  10. CCADB representative — Posted a final call for comments or questions and said the report would be closed around 2026-09-14.
Participants
Emudhra representative Mozilla representative CCADB representative
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