Ballot CSC-8 v3: Update to Revocation response mechanisms. key protection for EV certificates, and clean-up of 11.2.1 & Appendix B
Code Signing Certificate Working Group
Key dates
- Effective date
- 01 Jun 2021 5 years ago
- Voting opened
- 25 Mar 2021 5 years ago
- Voting closed
- 01 Apr 2021 5 years ago
- Discussion opened
- 18 Mar 2021 5 years ago
- Discussion closed
- 25 Mar 2021 5 years ago
Resources
AI Summary
Ballot overview
- Ballot CSC-8 v3 updates the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates from version 2.2 to version 2.3.
- The ballot page says the voting period ended and the ballot passed.
- The motion was proposed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft and endorsed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and Bruce Morton of EnTrust.
What the ballot changes
- Makes OCSP optional and requires CRLs instead, including changes in Appendix B for Code Signing and Timestamping certificates.
- Adds Common Criteria EAL 4+ to the supported key protection crypto modules for EV certificates in light of support for RSA 3072 keys.
- Cleans up Appendix B AIA value requirements so the issuing CA URL is used instead of the root certificate URL.
- Removes a clause in section 11.2.1 that conflicted with RFC3161 regarding timestamp responses and the TSA certificate chain.
Approval and voting
- Voting by Certificate Issuers: 7 total votes including abstentions, with 6 Yes, 0 No, and 1 Abstain.
- Voting by Certificate Consumers: 1 total vote including abstentions, with 1 Yes, 0 No, and 0 Abstain.
- The page states the bylaw requirements were met for both Certificate Issuers and Certificate Consumers.
- The page also states quorum was met.
Relevant dates
- The ballot page gives the discussion period as starting on 2021-03-18 at 17:30 Eastern Time and ending not before 2021-03-25 at 17:30 Eastern Time.
- The vote for approval period starts on 2021-03-25 at 17:30 Eastern Time and ends on 2021-04-01 at 17:30 Eastern Time.
- The revised document lists Version 2.3 effective on 2 May 2021.
- The relevant dates section lists 2021-06-01 for Appendix A (1), Appendix A (2), section 14.1, and section 16.2, and 2022-04-30 for Appendix A (3).
Compliance impact
- Appendix A (1): by 2021-06-01, CAs SHALL support minimum RSA-3072 for Code Signing Certificates, Root Certificates, and Subordinate CA Certificates, and SHALL NOT support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Code Signing Certificates.
- Appendix A (2): by 2021-06-01, CAs SHALL support minimum RSA-3072 for Timestamp Certificates, Root Certificates, and Subordinate CA Certificates, and SHALL NOT support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Timestamp Certificates.
- Appendix A (3): by 2022-04-30, CAs SHALL NOT support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Timestamp tokens.
- Section 14.1: after 2021-06-01, the CA shall meet EV Guidelines Section 14.1 for Non-EV and EV Code Signing Certificates.
- Section 16.2: for EV Code Signing Certificates, Signing Services shall protect private keys in a FIPS 140-2 level 2 or equivalent crypto module; after 2021-06-01, the same protection requirements SHALL apply to Non EV Code Signing Certificates.
- Effective date
- 2021-06-01
- Voting opened
- 2021-03-25
- Voting closed
- 2021-04-01
- Discussion opened
- 2021-03-18
- Discussion closed
- 2021-03-25
2021-06-01 — CAs must support minimum RSA-3072 and must not support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Code Signing Certificates Appendix A (1): Code Signing Certificates, Root Certificates, and Subordinate CA Certificates
2021-06-01 — CAs must support minimum RSA-3072 and must not support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Timestamp Certificates Appendix A (2): Timestamp Certificates, Root Certificates, and Subordinate CA Certificates
2022-04-30 — CAs must not support SHA-1 digest algorithm for Timestamp tokens Appendix A (3): Timestamp tokens
2021-06-01 — CAs must meet EV Guidelines Section 14.1 for Non-EV and EV Code Signing Certificates Section 14.1 applies to Non-EV and EV Code Signing Certificates after this date
2021-06-01 — Signing Services must protect private keys in a FIPS 140-2 level 2 or equivalent crypto module Section 16.2 applies to EV Code Signing Certificates, and after this date to Non EV Code Signing Certificates
AI-generated from the CABF ballot page. The official CABF article remains the authoritative source.
Vote result
Proposers
Ian McMillan of Microsoft, and endorsed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and Bruce Morton of EnTrust.
Excerpt
SearchHome » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » Ballot CSC-8 v3: Update to Revocation response mechanisms. key protection for EV certificates, and clean-up of 11.2.1 & Appendix BBallot CSC-8 v3: Update to Revocation response mechanisms. key protection for EV certificates, and clean-up of 11.2.1 & Appendix BThe voting period for Ballot CSC-8 has ended and the Ballot has Passed.