Ballot SC006: Revocation Timeline Extension
Server Certificate Working Group
Key dates
- Effective date
- 14 Sep 2018 7 years ago
- Voting opened
- 07 Sep 2018 7 years ago
- Voting closed
- 14 Sep 2018 7 years ago
- Discussion opened
- 31 Aug 2018 7 years ago
- Discussion closed
- 07 Sep 2018 7 years ago
Resources
AI Summary
Ballot overview
- Ballot SC006, Revocation Timeline Extension, was proposed as a Final Maintenance Guideline for the Baseline Requirements.
- The ballot passed.
- Voting by CAs: 23 yes votes, 0 no votes, 0 abstentions.
- Voting by browsers: 5 yes votes, 0 no votes, 0 abstentions.
- The page states quorum was met and the approval requirements were met for both CAs and browsers.
Main changes
- Revises the definition of Key Compromise to mean a private key is compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had access to it.
- Rewrites Section 4.9.1.1 to create a tiered revocation timeline for subscriber certificates.
- Requires revocation within 24 hours for certain cases, including:
- Subscriber requests revocation in writing
- Subscriber says the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization
- Evidence of subscriber private key compromise
- Evidence that validation of domain authorization or control for a FQDN or IP address in the certificate should not be relied upon
- For other listed cases, the CA should revoke within 24 hours and must revoke within 5 days.
- Revises Section 4.9.1.2 so subordinate CA certificates must be revoked within 7 days for listed causes.
- Requires CAs to provide a process for subscribers to request revocation of their own certificates and to maintain a continuous 24x7 ability to accept and respond to revocation requests and certificate problem reports.
- Requires public disclosure of instructions for reporting suspected private key compromise, certificate misuse, fraud, compromise, misuse, inappropriate conduct, or other certificate-related matters, including in CPS section 1.5.2.
- Requires the CA, within 24 hours after receiving a certificate problem report, to investigate and provide a preliminary report to both the subscriber and the reporting entity.
- Requires the CA to work with the subscriber and reporter to establish whether the certificate will be revoked and, if so, the revocation date.
- States that the time from receipt of the problem report or revocation-related notice to published revocation must not exceed the time frame in Section 4.9.1.1.
Dates
- Discussion period: 2018-08-31 20:00 UTC to 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC
- Voting period: 2018-09-07 20:00 UTC to 2018-09-14 20:00 UTC
- The ballot page does not state an IPR end date.
- The ballot page does not state a separate effective date.
- The ballot text includes revocation timelines of 24 hours, 5 days, and 7 days for the applicable certificate types and conditions.
Outcome
- The ballot passed and became normative based on the evidence provided.
- Effective date
- 2018-09-14
- Voting opened
- 2018-09-07
- Voting closed
- 2018-09-14
- Discussion opened
- 2018-08-31
- Discussion closed
- 2018-09-07
2018-09-14 — CAs must revoke within 24 hours for the listed immediate cases, or within 5 days for the listed SHOULD/MUST cases Subscriber certificates, for the revocation cases listed in Section 4.9.1.1
2018-09-14 — Issuing CAs must revoke within 7 days for the listed subordinate CA revocation cases Subordinate CA certificates, for the revocation cases listed in Section 4.9.1.2
AI-generated from the CABF ballot page. The official CABF article remains the authoritative source.
Proposers
Wayne Thayer of Mozilla and endorsed by Tim Hollebeek of DigiCert and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of Harica.
Excerpt
SearchHome » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » Ballot SC006: Revocation Timeline ExtensionBallot SC006: Revocation Timeline ExtensionVoting by CAs – 23 votes total including abstentions