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Bugzilla #370505 Root Inclusion

Microsec Ltd. root CA inclusion request for Microsec e-Szigno Root CA

RESOLVED FIXED Microsec Ltd.
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AI Summary

This case was Microsec Ltd.’s request to add the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA certificate to Mozilla’s root store. The request was opened by Microsec in 2007 and included details about its CP/CPS documents, audit oversight by the Hungarian National Communications Authority (NHH), and the types of certificates issued under the root. Mozilla reviewers asked for additional documentation, including clearer public CPS language and verification of the audit statement. Microsec provided a commitment letter, updated its CPS to add the requested verification statements, and later supplied an English translation of the CPS. The remaining issue was confirmation of the audit report’s authenticity; Kathleen Wilson later stated that the audit had been confirmed, completing information gathering. Mozilla then approved the request for the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA with trust bits for email, SSL, and code signing, and the bug was later marked RESOLVED FIXED after the NSS implementation bug was filed and resolved.

Model: gpt-5.4-mini Generated: 2026-06-13 11:57 UTC Revised: 2026-06-16 19:09 UTC Confidence: 0.98 59 comments
Chronology
  1. Microsec opened a request to include the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA in Mozilla’s root store.
  2. Microsec said it had updated its CPS to include the requested verification statements.
  3. The audit was confirmed, completing the information-gathering phase.
  4. Mozilla approved inclusion of the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA with email, SSL, and code-signing trust bits.
  5. Mozilla filed the NSS implementation bug needed for the actual changes.
Thread Activity
  1. Berta representative — Microsec requested inclusion of its root certificate and described its CA services, policies, and audit oversight.
  2. Berta representative — Microsec said the audit document was now available from its website.
  3. Berta representative — Microsec confirmed domain, email, and code-signing verification practices and said it would update its CPS.
  4. Mozilla representative — Mozilla said it could proceed on the basis of an interim confirmation letter and asked Microsec to prepare one.
  5. Berta representative — Microsec attached a scanned copy of its commitment letter and said the original had been mailed.
  6. Mozilla representative — Mozilla said the audit document at the provided URL was a 404 and asked Microsec to get the auditor to host it.
  7. Berta representative — Microsec explained it could not control the auditor’s website and offered postal verification and direct contact details.
  8. Bolyard representative — Mozilla’s pending list showed the request status as information confirmed complete.
  9. Mozilla representative — Kathleen Wilson asked follow-up questions about SSL validation, audit verification, and problematic practices.
  10. Berta representative — Microsec answered the validation questions, provided example sites, and described its certificate practices.
  11. Mozilla representative — Mozilla said it did not remember verifying the NHH audit and suggested re-contacting NHH.
  12. Mozilla representative — Kathleen Wilson said the audit had been confirmed and assigned the request onward for public discussion.
  13. Hecker representative — Mozilla opened the first public discussion period for the request.
  14. Mozilla representative — Kathleen Wilson opened the second public discussion period.
  15. Mozilla representative — Kathleen Wilson summarized the assessment and recommended approval.
  16. Hecker representative — Mozilla approved the request for the Microsec e-Szigno Root CA with email, SSL, and code-signing trust bits.
  17. Mozilla representative — Kathleen Wilson filed bug 483852 against NSS for the implementation changes.
Participants
Berta representative Mozilla representative Hecker representative Bolyard representative Startcom representative
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